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An important part of China’s development is the continued movement of the rural labor
force into non-agricultural employment.  Off-farm sources of income in China have been a major
component of rising rural incomes over the last 20 years.  Non-farm income also lowers income
risk for rural households by decreasing farm household’s exposure to the arbitrary shocks of
agricultural income.  As industrialization advances, unobstructed movement of labor out of
agriculture will help keep wages low so that China’s industries can maintain labor intensive
practices and continue to bring labor into the industrial sector.
Scholars debate the extent to which China’s rural labor market operates without
obstruction.  Some scholars point to the fact that over 100 million rural workers have gained off-
farm employment over the last 20 years as evidence that China’s rural labor market is well
developed, especially when compared to other rural markets (Rozelle, et. al., forthcoming;
Parish, Zhe and Li, 1996).  China’s high inequality between agricultural and non-agricultural
incomes and a disproportionate share of labor in agriculture, however, suggest that there are
obstructions to the free flow of labor out of agriculture.  In light of these observations, some
scholars argue that institutional restrictions, inhibit rural worker’s access to off-farm employment
(Yang and Zhou, 1996;  Carter, Zhong and Cai, 1996).
The objective of this paper is to determine whether China’s land management system
deters workers in farm households from off-farm employment participation.  Farmer’s in China
may lose the rights to farmland if they find off-farm employment (Yang, 1997).  This potential
loss can be viewed as a fixed cost to exiting agriculture and the size of this cost is correlated with
the degree of tenure insecurity facing the household.  Farmers may also be able to lower their
tenure insecurity by maintaining high agricultural production on their land.  In this paper, I2
include variables that represent village-level land insecurity in empirical models of off-farm
employment participation and test for whether the off-farm labor market participation for
households in villages with a higher degree of insecurity is significantly different than those in
relatively secure villages.
Land Policy and Off-Farm Labor in China
Farmers do not own the rights to their land in China, instead, land is nominally owned by
organizations above the household (usually the xiaozu, or the village) and the rights to farm land
are allocated by local leaders to households.  Occasionally, local leaders decide to carry-out
village-wide reallocations of farmland.  In these reallocations, rights to land are taken away from
some households and given to others.  This introduces an element of land tenure insecurity for
farm households in rural China.  Households may lose rights to the land they currently farm in
future village-wide reallocations.
The reasons why village leaders conduct village-wide reallocations vary from village to
village, as does the criteria for who gains and who loses in these reallocations.  The original
allocation of land in the early 1980s (following the adoption of the Household Responsibility
System) was intended to provide an egalitarian land distribution:  each household was allocated
land according to the number of persons in the household.  As the number of persons in each
household changed over time, land allocations no longer represented an egalitarian distribution.
One reason village leaders reallocate rights to farmland, therefore, is to reflect changes in
household composition that occur over time.
Recent research has identified other possible reasons village leaders choose to reallocate
farm land from one household to another.  Li and Rozelle (1998) explore a variety of potential3
explanations of village leaders reallocation behavior and conclude that village leaders pursue
three objectives:  1) they protect their own personal interests; 2) they minimize the administrative
costs of fulfilling policy objectives; and 3) they seek to improve land-use productivity and
efficiency.  Benjamin and Brandt (1999) echo this last objective and argue that village land
reallocations serve to maintain high levels of agricultural production.  Both these studies find
evidence that off-farm employment is a significant determinant of land reallocation and
negatively impacts a household’s overall land allocation.  This may be because households with
off-farm employment farm their land less intensively than do those without (efficiency
motivation), or because households with off-farm labor have alternative sources of income
(equity motivation).
The fact that households with off-farm labor are more likely to lose land in village
reallocations raises the question of whether this is viewed as a cost of exiting agriculture and is
considered in farmer’s labor allocation decisions.  If so, farmers facing high tenure insecurity
may be discouraged from finding off-farm sources of income.  This exacerbates the inequality
between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes and deters farmers from spreading income
risk over several different income sources.  In the following section, I discuss how land tenure
insecurity may affect the labor allocation decisions of farmers in rural China and the empirical
implications of this effect.
Working Hypothesis
The way in which land tenure insecurity enters farmers off-farm work decisions depends
largely on the reasons village leaders reallocate land.  If land is reallocated from households with
off-farm employment to households without because village leaders want to maintain relative4
income equality, then the potential loss enters the households’ decision as a fixed cost.  If village
leaders reallocate land away from households with off-farm employment in order to increase
overall labor input into agriculture, then households may be able to maintain tenure security by
maintaining high levels of production on the land allocated to them while also participating in
off-farm emplyment.
If households are likely to lose land regardless of their agricultural production, then they
face a pure fixed cost to exiting agriculture.  Following Cogin (1981), these fixed costs deter
household’s from allocating labor off the farm unless they can be assured of a fixed number of
days (reservation days) of off-farm employment sufficient to cover the costs of potentially losing
some land.  These reservation days give rise to the following two hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1:  Households facing tenure insecurity are less likely to allocate labor off-farm.
Hypothesis 2:  Households facing tenure insecurity that do allocate labor off-farm tend to work
more hours off-farm than household’s with relative tenure security.
Alternatively, village leaders may reallocate land away from households with off-farm
employment because those households allocate less labor to agriculture and allow production on
their plots to decline.  To maintain high agricultural output, village leaders may decide to take
land from these households and give it to households who will farm the land more intensively.
In this case, households may freely allocate labor off-farm, as long as they allocate a high level
of labor to agriculture.  Under these circumstances, hypothesis 1 would still be true but
hypothesis 2 would not.  Farm households facing tenure insecurity would tend to allocate fewer5
days to off-farm employment.  In addition, the requirement that households maintain high
agricultural production may affect the type of off-farm work households choose.  Some forms,
such as migration or working in a local factory, may not provide enough flexibility for
households to allocate sufficient labor to agriculture during periods of peak labor demand.
Empirical Approach
Empirical studies of farm household’s off-farm labor participation generally model off-
farm participation as a function of household demographic and human capital variables,
variables that represent transaction costs (such as distance from towns and transportation
infrastructure) and the local wage.  The empirical models I use include both household- and
village- level variables to capture these effects.  The specific variables used and their means are
given in Table 2.
I estimate this function using two types of off-farm labor market participation variables
as the dependent variable.  The first is a probit estimate of the probability of working off-farm
and uses an off-farm labor market participation dummy (one if the household has an off-farm
worker).  The second estimate is the number of days the household allocates to off-farm work.
This is an OLS regression estimated only on the households participating.  I also estimate these
functions for participation and number of days working off-farm in two sub-categories, local
self-employment and local worker and I estimate participation in migration (the number of days
for migrants is not included in the survey data).
To test for the effects of village policy, I include a village-level measure of land
insecurity.  I use is the percent of village households that have had their land holdings change
(either increase or decrease) in a village-wide reallocation to capture the effects of village land6
management policy.  Households in villages where many households have been affected by
village-wide reallocations feel a higher likelihood that they could lose land in a village-wide
reallocation.  The level of tenure insecurity faced by households, therefore, is positively
correlated with the proportion of households previously affected by village-wide reallocations.
Table 1 shows the percent of households affected by village-wide reallocations in the 31 villages
in the sample and reveals that some villages have had no village-wide reallocations while in
other villages, more than seventy percent of the households have experienced changes in their
land endowments due to village-wide reallocations.  The empirical question is whether
heterogeneity between villages’ land management practices affects household’s off-farm work
decisions.
While land is usually not included in empirical models of off-farm participation in
developed countries, it is in empirical work on low-income developing economies.  Low-income
developing economies often exhibit high transaction costs for most employment other than
farming and the amount of household land is an important component of the marginal product of
labor in agriculture.  For these reasons, a household’s land endowment will affect the
household’s off-farm employment participation decisions.
Farm households usually can choose the amount of land they farm by purchasing or
renting land on the land market.  In China, however, there is no private land ownership and very
little land renting.  The price at which farmers are willing to rent out land is above the price
farmers are willing to pay.  This also may be due to tenure insecurity (renting out land is a signal
to village leaders that the land is not needed by the household and therefore invites
dispossession) or due to the egalitarian distribution and small size of land holdings.7
Due to the rigidity in the amount of land farmed by rural households in China, land size
could be considered as fixed and included in an empirical model of off-farm employment
participation.  If farmers can choose land, however, then land size is endogenous to the
household’s utility maximization decision.  In addition, past labor market participation by the
household may have already brought on dispossession of land, and off-farm labor market
participation is often serially correlated.  This introduces an additional source of potential
endogeneity whereby household’s land holdings are a function of past off-farm employment
which, in turn, is strongly correlated with current off-farm employment.
To address these potential endogeniety problems of household’s land endowment, I
estimate the models using an instrumented variable for household’s land holdings.  The
instruments used reflect village and township level and political and policy characteristics and
average household land endowments in the village.
1  The political and policy characteristics are
intended to reflect the level of government meddling in land allocations.  Households in villages
with a high degree of local meddling in land allocation are more likely have a correlation
between past employment and current land holdings.  Local meddling in land policy does not, by
itself, affect the household’s off-farm employment decisions.
In addition to the policy instruments, I also include village average land per household as
an instrument.  There is significant variation in the average land per household in the 31 villages
surveyed and no inter-village land transfers.  The amount of land farmed by the household is
largely determined by whether they are in a land rich or land poor village.  Variations around the
village mean are the part that is determined by village reallocation policy or land rental
transactions.  One may argue that either land rich or land poor villages are more (or less) likely
                                                       
1 The political and policy variables used are the number of Party members in the village and the percent of
households involved in village-wide reallocation in other villages within the township8
to have high levels of off-farm employment, and that this implies that village average land
holdings are correlated with the dependent variable.  Descriptive statistics and multivariate
analysis using this data set, however, find no evidence of a correlation.
The empirical analysis is based on a survey of 787 households from 31 villages in Hebei
and Liaoning Provinces in the northeast part of China conducted in 1995.  The survey collected
detailed information on household human capital, demographic characteristics, wealth and off-
farm employment.  Village-level variables were also collected by a community-level survey of
the same villages in 1996.  Of the 787 housholds surveyed, 766 had farm land and of these 605
had off-farm employment.  The analysis is restricted to the households with farmland.
Results
Table 3 reports my econometric results for the participation decision.  The negative and
significant coefficient on the insecurity variable in columns 1 and 2 suggests that households in
villages with relatively high insecurity are less likely to participate in off-farm employment.
These results also hold for local self-employment, but not for local workers or migration
(columns 3-8).  This is a somewhat surprising result.  Migrant workers are often viewed as
having left the household so invite dispossession more than other types of off-farm employment
while self-employment should offer more flexibility in working schedules to allow for sufficient
labor allocation to agriculture.
Village land policy appears to affect off-farm labor participation decisions and the effect
is sizeable.  A 20 percent decline in the percent of households affected by village-wide
reallocations increases the probability of working off-farm by about six percent.  This is about
the same as the effect of having one more worker in the household.  It is impossible to estimate9
what the results would be under total tenure security, but the evidence is that the effect could be
sufficient to explain some of the agricultural versus non-agricultural income gap.
Land tenure insecurity does not appear to affect the number of days households allocate
to off-farm employment.  Table 4 reports the results from regressing the number of days spent in
the various off-farm categories on the independent variables.  The insecurity variable is
insignificant in all the specifications.  Township level features and policies generally have a
more significant affect on household’s labor decisions than village level land management policy
does.  This provides little evidence that households are prevented from participating more in off-
farm employment because they must allocate a high amount of labor to agriculture.
Conclusion
Understanding the reasons why more rural workers do not participate in off-farm
employment in China is important.  The movement of labor from agriculture to non-agricultural
sources of income is a major feature in China’s economic transformation from an agricultural to
an industrial economy.  Off-farm sources of income are the primary means for rural households
to increase their living standards.
Village level land management practices appear to be among the reasons some
households find off-farm jobs while others do not.  The threat of losing land if household
workers find off-farm employment deters workers from accessing these jobs.  This restricts labor
supply to the non-agricultural demanders of labor and increases the number of workers relying
on agricultural employment.  These effects may in part explain the gap between agricultural
versus non agricultural incomes in rural China.10
Table 1.  The Percent of Households Affected by Village-Wide Reallocations in 31 Villages
Table 2.  Description and Means of Independent Variables used in Multivariate Analysis
Variable Name Variable Description Mean S.D.
Household
Household Size Number of Persons in the Household 3.98 1.14
Household Workers Number of Workers in the Household 2.76 1.08
Gender Percent of Female Workers .48 .16
Tech Training Number of Workers with Technical Training .23 .50
Apprenticeships Number of Workers with Apprentice Training .22 .47
Education 1 Most Educated persons Level of Education 7.8 2.3
Education 2 The Percent of Adults who are Literate .57 .25
Experience Average Worker’s Age (minus 15) 12.5 8.2
Experience Squared Average Worker’s Age Squared 225 495
Wealth Current Value of Non-Productive Assets 2333 3641
Total Land Land Allocated to Household 18.5 12.8
Village
Wage Village Average Wage Rate (Daily) 9.1 4.7
Ag. Prices Village Average Corn Price .62 .17
Distance 1 Distance to Nearest Periodic Market 5.9 5.0
Distance 2 Distance to County Seat 15.9 16.7
Insecurity The Percent of Households with Land Changes
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Township Dummies** 40.7*** 40.9*** 23.2 23.2 33.8*** 33.4*** 205*** 502***
Pseudo R-Squared 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.22
* probit regressions (dF/dx reported), a-unistrumented, b-instrumented, absolute value of t-stats
in parenthesis
** Chi-Squared statistic testing the joint significance of township dummy variables12
Table 4.  Determinants of the Number of Days Spent in the Given Off-Farm Employment
Categories
Total Off-Farm Local Self-Employed Local Worker



































































































































































































Township Dummies (F) 3.32*** 3.33*** 0.87 0.97 2.7*** 2.25***
Adjusted R-Squared 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.11 0.29 0.28
* OLS regressions on the households participating in the given category, a-unistrumented, b-
instrumented, absolute value of t-stats in parenthesis13
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